`CREATE DATABASE clankerdb TEMPLATE sourcedb STRATEGY=FILE_COPY;`.
But Ardent can be useful for many, because cloud providers uses heavily restricted Postgres. And many use Aurora, which doesn't event let configure the `log_line_prefix`.
Though if cloud providers add file_copy_method=CLONE compatible managed pg ...
heroku pg:backups:capture --app x
heroku pg:backups:download --app x
pg_restore --verbose --clean --no-acl --no-owner -h localhost -U postgres -d y local_db_for_robots_etc.dump
https://docs.tryardent.com/architecture
But essentially we get around the restrictions of the original DB by replicating into a different postgres compatible DB that essentially serves as a read replica. That DB is the one that branches but since it mirrors the original DB you get effective clones
By doing this we get a lot more control over what we can do to create the clones. The read replica clones using copy on write + isolated autoscaling compute to clone in 6s. We use neon to do this since we think they've implemented those two properties well.
Since it's default postgres logical replication + DDL triggers you can technically point it at any "branching enabled" db on the other end in order to achieve the same effect
I'd think you could also setup logical rep to a VM then snapshot and clone the storage which is generally pretty fast.
aws rds restore-db-cluster-to-point-in-time \
--source-db-cluster-identifier <source-cluster> \
--db-cluster-identifier <new-cluster> \
--restore-type copy-on-write \
--use-latest-restorable-time \
--db-subnet-group-name <sub group> \
--vpc-security-group-ids <security group> \
--serverless-v2-scaling-configuration MinCapacity=0,MaxCapacity=16> The source database can't have any active connections during cloning.
I wouldn't mind some lock contention, but having to kill all connections seemed a bit harsh
There is still value in carefully testing on your prod DB, but for that you could just easily maintain a read replica. I don’t see the need for a SaaS here.
On the real world data impact I absolutely agree. We added something called "branch hooks" which essentially let you define SQL to run against the branch before it's returned
This lets you essentially anonymize and modify the branch to scrub unintended external side effects.
It's something that we're still working on though and trying to design the right abstractions around because we want to get that part right.
I’m very confused as to the target market here
Neon does support copy on write branching natively and autoscaling compute but you make certain performance tradeoffs. A lot of the folks we've talked to that use RDS or Planetscale are reliant on things like query latencies supported by that platform's specific architecture but also want the ability to test on branches. We let you get the best of both worlds (branch but leave your DB where it is and freely choose your production environment based on prod concerns)
Supabase does have branching but they do not branch the data so you can't test any interactions that rely on the data. You can restore from backup as an option but this slows down based on data size since you're actually moving data as opposed to copy on write.
Longer term we want to be the place you branch all your data infra. So expanding to S3, Snowflake, MySQL etc.
For now though we're focusing on just postgres and getting it right!
How does this compare to managing our own read-only replica with anonymized data?
We'd let you instantly clone prod + user defined auto-anonymization so you can test writes. The architecture also somewhat takes the place of an existing read replica if you want to use it like that to make it more cost efficient.
Also since we're using copy on write for the clones they're incredibly storage efficient and the autoscaling compute helps minimize cost on clones by minimizing excess compute uptime
I mean, they said "read-only" ...
It's called branch hooks and lets you register SQL to be run against the branch after it's created but before it's handed to you (or an agent)
So you can retain production shapes but manipulate the data however you want to make it safe
It's not uncommon (hex.ai, etc all do this, as do developers, MCP tools, etc). One thing we do at Ardent is enable obfuscated read replicas. We can strip PII in the replicas, so your agents are operating on realistic (but not sensitive) data. Moreover, they can do so in a way that doesn't impact your production database and is fast enough to wire into your CI/CD processes.
Jeremy is correct, though. The main risk/concern is primarily agents with write access. There are two high profile instances in the last year of agents dropping production databases (even when, in one case, after being given explicit instructions to never do such a thing). While read-replicas of a primary DB solve the "agents can't destroy things" problem, they don't solve things like testing schema migrations (in particular) or updates to the data.
It's not uncommon (Hex.ai, etc all do this, as do developers, MCP tools, etc). One thing we do at Ardent is enable obfuscated read replicas. We can strip PII in the replicas, so your agents are operating on very realistic (but not sensitive) data. Moreover, they can do so in a way that doesn't impact your production database and is fast enough to wire into your CI/CD processes.
Jeremy is correct, though. The main risk/concern is primarily agents with write access. There are two high profile instances in the last year of agents dropping production databases (even when, in one case, after being given explicit instructions to never do such a thing). While read-replicas of a primary DB solve the "agents can't destroy things" problem, they don't solve things like testing schema migrations (in particular) or updates to the data.
Small enough company without suitable MoC and they've got a real chance of getting it.
> I'm much more worried about people who give full write access to their agents! But at least this solves that problem.
Yeah it goes without saying that write access would be crazy... But, it seems like people don't really care about the fact that they are just giving their private data to companies like Anthropic, OpenAI and Google.
> Branch anonymization Branches default to a full copy of your production data.
<-- This doesn't seem a safe default to me...
Perhaps a data policy should be required to be in place before a branch can be cloned... The default configuration giving the LLM full prod data access by default, is a bad standard to set, I think.
Hey, I put on my pants the same way you do: by having my staff hold them up while I jump into them.
> But, it seems like people don't really care about the fact that they are just giving their private data to companies like Anthropic/Open AI and Google.
This isn't quite as risky as it seems. All of them have a TOS that says if you pay them enough money they won't train on your data. But you're right that there are probably a lot of people who aren't on those plans sharing private data.
> > Branch anonymization Branches default to a full copy of your production data. > <-- This doesn't seem a safe default to me...
Agreed, and I'm sure it will cause trouble if you don't also bring along with the copies the internal controls around access logging.
But also, for smaller companies, this isn't an issue since they don't have SOC2 and the other compliance needs yet. So it's probably a sane starting place for Ardent at this time. Most small startups let everyone in the company access the full database anyway.
> Perhaps a data policy should be required to be in place before a branch can be cloned... The default configuration giving the LLM full prod data access by default, is a bad standard to set, I think.
Or at least an easy way to copy it from the database you're branching from.
Yep! Agreed. We've tried to combat this with the "branch_hooks" being team/org level policy objects so we can do enforcement of any kind on the branches before they're ever actually handed to users. This would be things like access control + defined anonymization rules. The broader hope with this class of objects/policies is they can serve as enforcement barriers and essentially allow scoped access at the org level across branches.
The proxy we run in the middle also helps a lot here. Since the URL is minted by our control plane and is not the "real" DB url we can authenticate each user from the URL they're using and enforce RBAC controls.
for example:
User 1's API key is 1234
The CLI can auto-construct urls like: postgresql://{APIKEY}:{ANYTHING}@{IDENTIFIER}--postgres.routing.tryardent.com:5432/DB_NAME?{params}
Your API key is something that can be scoped per user
This is an off the cuff example but essentially we have a way of knowing who is calling the host and thus can enforce if APIKEY = You can't access this DB based on whatever rules.
Curious to understand what additional pieces would be helpful here because this is 100% very important to get right.
One note on the pricing: it would kind of bum me out to pay $250/month for $100/month in credit.
That feels like I'm losing $150/month.
We self-host DBLab since we had trouble getting Xata, Neon, and hosted DBLab configured.